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I. INTRODUCTION
 Imagine you are arrested and formally charged with a crime you 
did not commit, or a crime for which you had a good defense at the 
time of the offense and for some time thereafter. The police chose to 
arrest and charge you the day before the five-year statute of limita-
tions was set to run. You had no idea you were even being investigat-
ed up until the time of your arrest. Because of the lapse in time prior 
to your arrest, your ability to defend yourself from the charges brought 
against you has been severely hampered. Perhaps you had alibi wit-
nesses or eyewitnesses that you could have called at trial to support 
your case if the prosecution had formally charged you at an earlier 
time—witnesses whose testimony would have all but confirmed your 
innocence. Due to the five years that passed, however, those witness-
es are either deceased, cannot be found, or cannot remember any-
thing from that far back. You have no other witnesses that you can 
call to support your defense and rebut the prosecution’s case. 
 Situations of pre-accusation delay like the one described above1 are 
not protected by the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment.2
        
? J.D. 2013, cum laude, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to 
thank my parents for their love and support. I would also like to thank Judge Ronald 
Swanson, Florida First District Court of Appeal, for his helpful suggestions in choosing to 
write about the topic of pre-accusation delay, and Professor Wayne Logan, Florida State 
University College of Law, for his helpful guidance and feedback. 
 1. A similar and more detailed “illustration” can be found in Phyllis Goldfarb, When 
Judges Abandon Analogy: The Problem of Delay in Commencing Criminal Prosecutions, 31 
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That is because the “speedy trial provision . . . [is] ‘an important 
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to tri-
al, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation 
and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of 
an accused to defend himself.’ ”3 However, 
the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee ex-
ist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused’s de-
fense. . . . Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with 
the defendant’s liberty . . . and that may disrupt his employment, 
drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to 
public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.4
 Conversely, the distinct constitutional anchors and purposes of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause make it a more appropri-
ate safeguard in situations involving pre-accusation delay.5 Ordinari-
ly, statutes of limitation act as the primary safeguard against pre-
accusation delay, but the Supreme Court has recognized that “the 
Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against 
        
WM. & MARY L. REV. 607, 611-12 (1990), where the author describes facts similar to those 
in a case that she litigated. Id. at 611 n.18.   
 2. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313-22 (1971). The Speedy Trial Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment is not the focus of this Note but will be referred to at times. Thus, 
it bears mentioning the general approach that the Supreme Court set forth for analyzing 
speedy trial claims: “The approach . . . is a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the 
prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
Factors to consider—“[t]hough some [courts] might express them in different ways”—are: 
“[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and 
prejudice to the defendant.” Id. None of these factors are “necessary or sufficient 
condition[s] to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Id. at 533. Unlike 
pre-accusation delay, “the Speedy Trial Clause’s core concern is impairment of liberty.” 
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986). Cases and law review articles have 
examined speedy trial rights both before and after Barker, but one recent law review 
article has also examined speedy trial rights in the international context, focusing on India. 
See Jayanth K. Krishnan & C. Raj Kumar, Delay in Process, Denial of Justice: The 
Jurisprudence and Empirics of Speedy Trials in Comparative Perspective, 42 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 747 (2011). 
 3. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)). 
 4. Id.
 5. See id. at 324-26. Courts refer to this delay as pre-accusation delay, pre-
indictment delay, pre-arrest delay, and other similar terms. Throughout this Note, I will 
use the phrase “pre-accusation delay” because the topic involves delay prior to formal 
accusation. Formal accusation is “triggered by arrest, indictment, or other official 
accusation.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992). When one formally 
becomes an “accused,” speedy trial protections under the Sixth Amendment come into play. 
See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial . . . .”). The pre-accusation delay covered in this Note 
does not encompass the pre-arrest delay situation confronted in Doggett, where the 
defendant had previously been indicted but not arrested. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 648-50. 
Thus, although he had not been arrested, he was nonetheless formally accused at the time 
of his arrest and his claim was examined under the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 652. 
Rather, this Note deals with pre-accusation delay cases where the defendant has not been 
formally accused in any sense. See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977);
Marion, 404 U.S. 307. 
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oppressive delay.”6 Even if the statute of limitations in a given case 
has not run, pre-accusation delay may cause a defendant to “be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment.7
 While pre-accusation delay carries this potential due process vio-
lation, courts dispute the proper test to apply in determining whether 
a violation did in fact occur.8 All courts require actual prejudice; some 
require the prejudice to be substantial as well.9 Also, most courts re-
quire bad faith or intentional, tactical delay by the government in 
addition to prejudice; some courts, however, do not require a showing 
of bad faith but instead—after a finding of prejudice—balance the 
government’s reasons for the delay against the prejudice.10
 Part II of this Note examines the leading United States Supreme 
Court cases on pre-accusation delay, as well as the framework the 
Court set out for lower courts confronting the issue. Part III discuss-
es the test applied by the different circuit courts of appeals. Specifi-
cally, it explores the evolution of the approach established by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, discusses which 
circuits agree with the Fifth Circuit and which circuits do not, and 
then looks at the conflicting cases decided by the Seventh Circuit. 
Part IV examines how the states approach the issue of pre-accusation 
delay. It categorizes each of the states in a manner similar to the fed-
eral circuits and also separately reviews cases from a few states with 
unclear positions. This is the first piece to complete a fifty-state sur-
vey on the issue of pre-accusation delay. Part V analyzes some dis-
putes over the proper test to use and argues that it is time for the 
Supreme Court to again review the issue, as it has not done so in 
thirty-five years, and much confusing jurisprudence has emerged 
from various courts in that time.  
        
 6. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789. 
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”); Marion, 404 
U.S. at 324 (“[S]ince a criminal trial is the likely consequence of our judgment and since 
appellees may claim actual prejudice to their defense, it is appropriate to note here that the 
statute of limitations does not fully define the appellees’ rights with respect to the events 
occurring prior to indictment. Thus, the Government concedes that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment would require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial 
that the pre-[accusation] delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to appellees’ rights 
to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over 
the accused.” (citations omitted)).  
 8. See infra Parts III-IV.
 9. See infra Parts III-IV. One possible exception is New York, as it is unclear 
whether New York courts require prejudice at all. See infra pp. 682-83. 
 10. See infra Parts III-IV. 
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II. BACKGROUND: SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON 
PRE-ACCUSATION DELAY
 In 1971, the United States Supreme Court officially recognized for 
the first time that pre-accusation delay caused by the prosecution in 
a criminal case may result in a violation of a defendant’s due process 
rights.11 In establishing this major development in criminal law ju-
risprudence, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention 
that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights are applica-
ble in a situation involving pre-accusation delay.12 Instead, the Court 
distinguished speedy trial rights, finding they only apply after one 
becomes an “accused.”13 What makes the potential due process viola-
tion so exceptional is that it adds a constitutional protection to sup-
plement the protection already afforded by statutes of limitation in 
the context of pre-accusation delay.14 Statutes of limitation provide 
“the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charg-
es.”15 The Supreme Court has noted that 
[t]he purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to 
criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the 
occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by 
criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect indi-
viduals from having to defend themselves against charges when 
the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time 
and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts 
in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salu-
tary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to in-
vestigate suspected criminal activity.16
These observations have led the Court to conclude it is not neces-
sary “to press the Sixth Amendment into service” to address  
pre-accusation delay.17
 Even though the Sixth Amendment is not at play, examining 
whether potential due process violations exist under the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendment is necessary because statutes of limitation do 
not “fully define” an individual’s rights prior to indictment or arrest.18
Furthermore, statutes of limitation do not curtail the prosecution of 
capital offenses and certain other crimes; prosecution of those offenses 
        
 11. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324-26.  
 12. Id. at 313-22. 
 13. Id. at 313; see also supra notes 2, 5.
 14. Marion, 404 U.S. at 322-24. However, as will be discussed further, not all states 
have statutes of limitations, and even states that do have them do not necessarily have 
them for all crimes. See infra Part V. 
 15. Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966)).  
 16. Id. at 323 (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970)).  
 17. Id.
 18. Id. at 324. “[T]he Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting 
against oppressive delay.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977). 
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can be initiated at any time absent a due process violation.19 It is 
well-established that dismissal of a case is required by the Due Pro-
cess Clause when pre-accusation delay results in substantial preju-
dice to a defendant’s right to a fair trial, if that “delay was an inten-
tional device to gain tactical advantage over the [defendant].”20 With 
respect to the prejudice inquiry, however, the exact amount of preju-
dice that must be demonstrated for a due process violation to be recog-
nized is unclear. In addition, it is not evident whether prevailing on a 
claim requires that the delay constitute “an intentional device to gain 
a tactical advantage,” or whether recklessness, gross negligence, or 
even simple negligence by the government may suffice.21 The Supreme 
Court did not directly answer this question in Marion.22 Rather, it as-
serted that due process claims based on pre-accusation delay should 
be considered and disposed of on a case-by-case basis, acknowledging 
that very short delays can cause prejudice to a defendant’s case, but 
that dismissal is not warranted by “every delay-caused detriment.”23
 Approximately five-and-a-half years after Marion, the Supreme 
Court further considered pre-accusation delay in United States v. 
Lovasco.24 While the Court did introduce a few additional principles, 
it did not fully clarify the level of prejudice required and again re-
frained from explicitly stating whether intentional delay for tactical 
purposes is required or whether something less could lead to a suc-
cessful claim.25 The Court did, however, address its statement in 
Marion that “[e]vents of the trial may demonstrate actual prejudice, 
but at the present time [defendants]’ due process claims are specula-
tive and premature.”26 From this sentence flows the notion that  
although proof of actual prejudice does not make a claim “automati-
cally valid,” it does make it “concrete and ripe for adjudication.”27
Therefore, demonstrating actual prejudice is necessary—but not  
sufficient—to prove a due process violation based on pre-accusation 
delay.28 Examining a claim brought in response to the delay also  
requires “consider[ing] the reasons for the delay as well as the  
prejudice to the accused.”29
        
 19. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2012). 
 20. See, e.g., Marion, 404 U.S. at 324. In Marion, “the Government concede[d] that the 
Due Process Clause . . . require[s] dismissal . . . if it were shown at trial that the pre-
indictment delay . . . caused substantial prejudice to [one’s] rights to a fair trial and that 
the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.” Id.
 21. See id. at 324-26. 
 22. See generally id.
 23. Id. at 324-25. 
 24. 431 U.S. 783 (1977). 
 25. See generally id.
 26. Id. at 789 (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 326). 
 27. Id.
 28. Id. at 790. 
 29. Id.
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 In Lovasco, the Court recognized that the judiciary’s only task in 
resolving due process claims concerning pre-accusation delay is to 
determine whether the delay “violates those ‘fundamental concep-
tions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institu-
tions,’30 and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and de-
cency.’ ”31 While delays may sometimes rise to that level, judges 
should afford deference to a prosecutor’s decision as to when to seek 
an indictment rather than imposing their own personal views.32 A 
prosecutor has no duty to file charges if she does not think she can 
prove her case beyond a reasonable doubt, even if there is probable 
cause to proceed; she is also not necessarily duty-bound to file charg-
es at the very moment she first believes she can prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.33 The imposition of a contrary requirement would 
carry many negative consequences.34 As part of its discussion in 
Lovasco, the Court distinguished “investigative delay” from “delay 
undertaken by the Government solely ‘to gain tactical advantage over 
the accused,’ ”35 finding that “investigative delay is not so one-
sided.”36 The Court held that prosecuting a defendant subsequent to 
investigative delay does not violate the Due Process Clause, even if 
        
 30. Id. (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). 
 31. Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)). 
 32. See id.
 33. Id. at 791. 
 34. See id. at 791-93 (“To impose such a duty ‘would have a deleterious effect both 
upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself.’ From the 
perspective of potential defendants, requiring prosecutions to commence when probable 
cause is established is undesirable because it would increase the likelihood of unwarranted 
charges being filed, and would add to the time during which defendants stand accused but 
untried. . . . From the perspective of law enforcement officials, a requirement of immediate 
prosecution upon probable cause is equally unacceptable because it could make obtaining 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt impossible by causing potentially fruitful sources 
of information to evaporate before they are fully exploited. And from the standpoint of the 
courts, such a requirement is unwise because it would cause scarce resources to be 
consumed on cases that prove to be insubstantial, or that involve only some of the 
responsible parties or some of the criminal acts. . . . [In addition, a rule] compelling a 
prosecutor to file public charges as soon as the requisite proof has been developed against 
one participant on one charge would cause numerous problems in those cases in which a 
criminal transaction involves more than one person or more than one illegal act. . . . 
[I]nsisting on immediate prosecution once sufficient evidence is developed to obtain a 
conviction would [also] pressure prosecutors into resolving doubtful cases in favor of 
early—and possibly unwarranted—prosecutions.” (footnotes and citations omitted)). 
 35. Id. at 795 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971)). 
 36. Id. The Government again conceded intentional, tactical delay that causes 
substantial prejudice constitutes a due process violation. The Government, however, 
further conceded that “[a] due process violation might also be made out upon a showing of 
prosecutorial delay incurred in reckless disregard of circumstances, known to the 
prosecution, suggesting that there existed an appreciable risk that delay would impair the 
ability to mount an effective defense.” Id. at 795 n.17 (quoting Brief for United States at 
32-33 n.25, Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (No. 75-1844)). 
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the delay caused some prejudice.37 In closing, the Court reiterated that 
lower courts should consider these claims on a case-by-case basis.38
III. HOW THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS HAVE INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED MARION AND LOVASCO
A.  The Fifth Circuit’s Strict Two-Prong Approach 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lovasco on June 9, 
1977,39 and preceding the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. 
Townley on January 11, 1982,40 the Fifth Circuit issued roughly thir-
teen written opinions discussing Marion, Lovasco, and the issue of 
pre-accusation delay.41 Then, in Townley, the court attempted to clar-
ify its position and resolve questions that arose over the years from 
the way it disposed of pre-accusation delay cases.42 Despite ruling in 
favor of the government in Townley,43 the court adopted a test (here-
inafter “Townley test”) that was less stringent than what the gov-
ernment proposed.44 The court recognized that Marion and Lovasco
require actual prejudice, as well as consideration of the reasons for 
the delay.45 Thus, under the Townley test, a defendant must first 
prove the government’s delay caused actual prejudice to her case.46 If 
the defendant is unable to demonstrate actual prejudice, then the 
claim automatically fails.47 If the defendant, however, successfully 
proves actual prejudice, then the Townley test requires that the trial 
        
 37. Id. at 796. 
 38. Id. at 797. The Supreme Court noted, as in Marion, it still “could not determine in 
the abstract the circumstances in which pre[-]accusation delay would require dismissing 
prosecutions.” Id. at 796 (citing Marion, 404 U.S. at 324). Significantly, “in the intervening 
years [between Marion and Lovasco] so few defendants . . . established that they were 
prejudiced by delay that neither [the Supreme Court] nor any lower court . . . had a 
sustained opportunity to consider the constitutional significance of various reasons for 
delay.” Id. at 796-97. 
 39. See id. at 783. 
 40. 665 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1982), rejected by United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
 41. See United States v. Hendricks, 661 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Nixon, 634 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Durnin, 632 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 
1980); United States v. Surface, 624 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Marino, 617 
F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Ramos, 586 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Parker, 586 F.2d 422 (5th 
Cir. 1978); United States v. Willis, 583 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Medina-
Arellano, 569 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. West, 568 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Shaw, 555 F.2d 
1295 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 42. See generally 665 F.2d 579.  
 43. Id. at 580. 
 44. See id. at 582. 
 45. Id. at 581 (citing West, 568 F.2d at 367); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 
U.S. 783 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). 
 46. See Townley, 665 F.2d at 581-82. 
 47. Id.
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court “engage ‘in a sensitive balancing of the government’s need for 
an investigative delay . . . against the prejudice asserted by the de-
fendant.’ ”48 The Townley panel said Marion and Lovasco “do not 
stand for the proposition ‘that governmental interests not amounting 
to an intentional tactical delay will automatically justify prejudice to 
a defendant.’ ”49 According to the court, while this assertion conflicted 
with scattered dicta from previous Fifth Circuit cases, it was con-
sistent with the court’s holdings in earlier decisions.50
Townley remained good law until 1996, whereupon the Fifth Cir-
cuit granted an en banc rehearing in United States v. Crouch and re-
jected the Townley test.51 The indictment in Crouch was initially 
dismissed by the trial court, and it was subsequently affirmed on ap-
peal by a divided panel of Fifth Circuit judges.52 After the en banc 
rehearing, the court abandoned its position from Townley and instead 
held that bringing a successful claim of pre-accusation delay requires 
proof of actual, substantial prejudice and “that the prosecution pur-
posely delayed the indictment to gain tactical advantage or for other 
bad faith purpose.”53 Although the court announced this new test, it 
still held that the defendant failed to even meet his burden of demon-
strating actual and substantial prejudice, as opposed to simply poten-
tial prejudice.54 According to the court, “[e]vents of the trial may 
demonstrate actual prejudice, but at the present time appellees’ due 
process claims are speculative and premature.”55
 In rejecting Townley, the Fifth Circuit noted it was “not strictly 
bound by prior panel decisions.”56 Nonetheless, it asserted that its 
holding remained in accord with the majority of its prior decisions, 
        
 48. Id. at 582 (quoting United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312, 1317 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
 49. Id. (quoting Brand, 556 F.2d at 1317 n.7). 
 50. Id.; see also id. at 582 n.2 (“The statement is for the most part found in decisions 
that found that the defendant did not meet the threshold requirement of proving actual 
prejudice, so that the government’s justification for the delay was not brought into issue: 
United States v. Hendricks, 661 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ramos, 586 F.2d 
1078, 1079 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Willis, 583 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1107 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Butts, 524 
F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir. 1975). The general statement of the governmental malice 
requirement is also found in at least two other decisions, but there the reason for the 
government’s delay was factually reviewed and found justified (as in Lovasco) by 
investigative needs: United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 309–10 (5th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Durnin, 632 F.2d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1981).”).  
 51. See United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Interestingly, 
as will be discussed below, even though Townley is no longer good law in the Fifth Circuit, 
the Fourth Circuit’s test mirrors the Townley test. See infra Part III.C. In addition, the 
Townley test was adopted by Florida courts and remains good law in Florida. See infra 
pp. 678-79. 
 52. 84 F.3d at 1499. 
 53. Id. at 1500. 
 54. Id.
 55. Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 326 (1971)).  
 56. Id. at 1509. Precedent from prior panels can only be overturned by the court 
sitting en banc. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 857 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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even if language to the contrary existed in scattered opinions.57 The 
court then further discussed its rationale for requiring intentional, 
tactical delay or some other bad-faith purpose.58 It reasoned that nei-
ther Marion nor Lovasco referred to “balancing” or “weighing” preju-
dice against the reasons given for the delay.59 The court also observed 
that the Supreme Court’s language in United States v. Gouveia,60 “al-
beit in dicta,” appeared to support its interpretation of Marion and 
Lovasco.61 It noted that most circuit courts of appeals stood in agree-
ment with its holding.62 Moreover, the court offered two further ex-
planations to support its reasoning.63 First, it asserted, “[h]istorically, 
this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions 
of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty,”64 meaning “the Due Process Clause . . . is not implicated by  
the lack of due care of an official causing unintended injury to life,  
liberty or property.”65 Second, the court stated that finding a due pro-
cess violation when the government acted in good faith could lead to 
separation-of-powers issues.66
 After concluding its discussion of bad faith, the court reviewed the 
prejudice requirement.67 It reiterated that the prejudice prong is not 
met by merely demonstrating presumptive or potential prejudice, but 
that “actual” prejudice must be shown.68 In addition, the court as-
serted that the prejudice has to be “substantial” as well.69 According 
to the court, requiring actual, substantial prejudice is consistent  
with the notion of due process,70 and “deprivation [of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law] will normally occur only by 
        
 57. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1508-09. On that note, the court mentioned a handful of post-
Marion, pre-Lovasco cases, as well as numerous other post-Lovasco cases decided by the 
Fifth Circuit with similar holdings. See id. at 1508, 1509 n.9.  
 58. See id. at 1510-14. 
 59. Id. at 1510.  
 60. 467 U.S. 180 (1984). 
 61. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1510; Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 192 (“But applicable statutes of 
limitations protect against the prosecution’s bringing stale criminal charges against any 
defendant, and, beyond that protection, the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an 
indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can 
prove that the Government’s delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to 
gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice in presenting his 
defense.” (citations omitted)). The Supreme Court in Gouveia, however, merely repeated 
what it said in Marion. That is, dismissal is required under the stated circumstances. This 
does not mean, however, that dismissal is required only under these circumstances.  
 62. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1511-12. See infra Part III.B. for a discussion of cases from  
those circuits. 
 63. See Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1512-14. 
 64. Id. at 1513 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). 
 65. Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986)). 
 66. Id.
 67. See id. at 1514-23.  
 68. Id. at 1515. 
 69. Id.
 70. Id.
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conviction, and not simply by trial itself.”71 Relying on United States 
v. MacDonald72 and United States v. Marion,73 the Fifth Circuit then 
stated that one who is unsuccessful in proving pre-accusation delay 
prior to trial can always raise the claim again following trial, with a 
greater chance of prevailing at that point.74 From this, the court con-
cluded that “a far stronger showing is required to establish the requi-
site actual, substantial prejudice pretrial than would be required af-
ter trial and conviction.”75 The court even went a step further and 
remarked, “it is difficult to imagine how a pretrial showing of preju-
dice would not in almost all cases be to some significant extent specu-
lative and potential rather than actual and substantial.”76    
B.  Other Circuits Using a Strict Two-Prong Approach 
 When the Fifth Circuit decided Crouch, it noted that the First,  
Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits 
agreed with the rule it applied;77 that is, when the statute of limitations 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 71. Id. at 1516; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. Interestingly, by parenthetical, the 
Fifth Circuit compares the following statements made by the Supreme Court in Olim v. 
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983): “Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional 
purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim 
of entitlement.” Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1516 (quoting Olim, 461 U.S. at 250). 
 72. 435 U.S. 850 (1978). In relying on MacDonald, the Fifth Circuit analogized to the 
Supreme Court’s statement that “[u]nlike the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, the Speedy Trial Clause does not . . . encompass a ‘right not to be tried’ which must 
be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all.” Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1516 (quoting 
MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 861). To further support its contention, the Fifth Circuit also 
mentioned the following language from MacDonald:
Before trial, of course, an estimate of the degree to which delay has impaired 
an adequate defense tends to be speculative. . . . The essence of a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment claim in the usual case is that the passage of time has 
frustrated his ability to establish his innocence of the crime charged. Normally, it 
is only after trial that that claim may fairly be assessed.
Id. (quoting MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 858-59). Interestingly, even though the Fifth Circuit 
analogized to the Speedy Trial Clause here, it had just concluded saying the trial court’s 
reliance on Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), was misplaced, because Doggett
involved a case of post-indictment delay brought under the Sixth Amendment. Crouch,
84 F.3d at 1515.  
 73. 404 U.S. 307 (1971). The Fifth Circuit mentioned the Supreme Court’s statement 
that “[e]vents of the trial may demonstrate actual prejudice, but at the present time 
appellees’ due process claims are speculative and premature.” Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1516 
(quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 326). In a parenthetical, the Fifth Circuit also mentioned  
the Supreme Court’s statement in MacDonald that “[t]he denial of a pretrial motion to 
dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds does not indicate that a like motion made 
after trial—when prejudice can better be gauged—would also be denied.” Id. (quoting 
MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 858-59).  
 74. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1516. 
 75. Id.
 76. Id.
 77. Id. at 1511-12. The opinion cited the following cases from those circuits: United 
States v. Crooks, 766 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 
1987); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Brown, 959 
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has not run, “dismissal for [pre-accusation] delay requires a showing 
not only of substantial, actual prejudice, but also that the prosecutor 
intentionally delayed [formal accusation] to gain tactical advantage 
or to advance some other improper purpose.”78 An updated examina-
tion of cases from those circuits indicates that they all—with the ex-
ception of the Seventh Circuit, which has not been clear on its posi-
tion79—still appear to require intentional, tactical delay or some oth-
er bad-faith purpose instead of a more flexible balancing test.80 Inter-
estingly though, in considering the separate but related issue of 
whether a delay prior to resentencing violates the Due Process 
Clause, the Second Circuit has employed a balancing test (instead of 
a strict bad-faith requirement), despite vehemently analogizing  
to the context of due process violations based on pre-accusation de-
lay.81 This, at least in part, seems to weigh against the Fifth Circuit’s  
deliberateness rationale.82
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Engstrom, 965 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hayes, 40 F.3d 362 (11th Cir. 
1994); and United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991). These opinions do not use 
identical language, but they all essentially require intentional, tactical delay or some other 
type of bad faith.  
 78. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1511.  
 79. In fact, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the Seventh Circuit case it cited in 
Crouch was not entirely accurate. See infra Part III.D.  
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Bater, 594 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[E]xcessive pre-
[accusation] delay can sometimes, albeit rarely, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause if the defendant shows both that the ‘delay caused substantial prejudice to his right 
to a fair trial’ and that ‘the [g]overnment intentionally delayed indictment . . . to gain a 
tactical advantage.’ ” (quoting United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1986))); 
United States v. Cornielle, 171 F.3d 748, 752 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A defendant bears the ‘heavy 
burden’ of proving both that he suffered actual prejudice because of the alleged pre-
[accusation] delay and that such delay was a course intentionally pursued by the 
government for an improper purpose.”); United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 150-51 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“[The defendant] can make out a claim under the Due Process Clause only if he 
can show both (1) that the delay between the crime and the federal indictment actually 
prejudiced his defense; and (2) that the government deliberately delayed bringing the 
indictment in order to obtain an improper tactical advantage or to harass him.”); United 
States v. Schaffer, 586 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In this circuit, dismissal for pre-
[accusation] delay ‘is warranted only when the defendant shows substantial prejudice to 
his right to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device by the government to 
gain a tactical advantage.’ ” (quoting United States v. Greene, 737 F.2d 572, 574 (6th Cir. 
1984))); United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 465 (10th Cir. 2006) (“To prevail on 
such a claim, the defendant must prove (1) the delay resulted in substantial prejudice to 
his rights, and (2) the prosecution intentionally delayed prosecution in order to gain a 
tactical advantage.”); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[F]or 
. . . dismissal to [be] proper, [one must show] that pre-indictment delay caused him actual 
[and] substantial prejudice and that the delay was the product of a deliberate act by the 
government designed to gain a tactical advantage.”); Mills, 925 F.2d at 464 (“Such delay 
offends due process if the defendant can carry the burden of showing ‘(1) that the government 
delayed bringing the indictment in order to gain a tactical advantage; and (2) that the delay 
caused him actual and substantial prejudice.’ ” (quoting United States v. Fuesting, 845 F.2d 
664, 669 (7th Cir. 1988))).  
 81. See United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 199-202 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. 
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 Significantly, the Eighth Circuit was omitted from the Fifth Circuit’s 
list in Crouch. The reason for this is because of conflicting decisions  
issued by the Eighth Circuit in the years leading up to Crouch, which 
the Fifth Circuit at least recognized in a footnote.83 Specifically, the 
Eighth Circuit’s 1994 decision in United States v. Miller,84 which used 
a balancing test, conflicted with its decision in United States v. 
Stierwalt85 from earlier that year, as well as its decision in United 
States v. Scoggins86 from the previous year. As the Fifth Circuit not-
ed, Miller did not reference either case.87 Although the Eighth Circuit 
has issued conflicting decisions on pre-accusation delay, its more re-
cent cases appear to be in accord with the Fifth Circuit.88
C.  Circuits that Reject the Strict Two-Prong Test 
 Contrary to the Courts of Appeals that require proof of bad faith 
to prevail on a claim of pre-accusation delay where “actual prejudice” 
is found to exist, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits balance the prejudice 
against the reasons offered by the government to justify the delay.89
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit only cited the now-overruled Town-
ley decision when it adopted this approach in Automated Medical La-
boratories.90 In discussing its reasons for utilizing a balancing test in 
another case, the Fourth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court’s 
mandate of a case-by-case inquiry makes a balancing test more ap-
propriate than a black-letter rule.91 The Ninth Circuit has applied 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 83. See 84 F.3d at 1512 n.15. 
 84. 20 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 85. 16 F.3d 282 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 86. 992 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 87. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1512 n.15. 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 446 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 2006) (“In contrast 
to the balancing test used in Sixth Amendment cases, defendants claiming a due process 
violation for pre-indictment delay must carry the burden of proof on two separate elements. 
The defendant must establish that: (1) the delay resulted in actual and substantial 
prejudice to the presentation of his defense; and (2) the government intentionally delayed 
his indictment either to gain a tactical advantage or to harass him.” (citing United States 
v. Sturdy, 207 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2000))). 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Uribe-Rios, 558 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2009) (“First, we 
ask whether the defendant has satisfied his burden of proving ‘actual prejudice.’ Second, if 
that threshold requirement is met, we consider the government’s reasons for the delay, 
‘balancing the prejudice to the defendant with the Government’s justification for delay.’ ” 
(citing United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 403-04 (4th Cir. 1985))); 
United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[The defendant] 
must satisfy both prongs of a two-part test. First, he must prove ‘actual, non-speculative 
prejudice from the delay.’ Second, the length of the delay is weighed against the reasons for 
the delay . . . .” (citations omitted)). As these two cases show, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits 
only require “actual prejudice,” rather than “actual and substantial prejudice.” The Third 
Circuit also appears to not require “substantial” prejudice, even though it agrees with the 
Fifth Circuit on bad faith. See United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 150-51 (3d Cir. 
2000); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 167 (3d Cir. 1987).  
 90. See 770 F.2d at 403-04. 
 91. Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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similar reasoning and has also explained that Marion and Lovasco do 
“not set out intent or recklessness as required standards of fault.”92
D.  No Clear Position in the Seventh Circuit 
 In the years leading up to Crouch, the Seventh Circuit issued con-
flicting decisions on pre-accusation delay.93 Its position is still not en-
tirely clear. Interestingly, when the Fifth Circuit discussed the other 
circuits in agreement with its approach in Crouch, it mentioned the 
Seventh Circuit and cited United States v. Sowa94 in support.95 In 
Sowa, the Seventh Circuit never did clearly adopt the same approach 
as the Fifth Circuit in Crouch. In fact, the court in Crouch may have 
been partially incorrect with the manner in which it categorized 
Sowa. The Sowa opinion states intentional, tactical delay is re-
quired,96 but it also asserts that “once the defendant has proven ac-
tual and substantial prejudice, the government must come forward 
and provide its reasons for the delay. The government’s reasons are 
then balanced against the defendant’s prejudice to determine wheth-
er the defendant has been denied due process.”97 This was echoed in 
United States v. Pardue, a case the Seventh Circuit decided after the 
Fifth Circuit decided Crouch.98 Yet, a more recent case from the Sev-
enth Circuit considered intentional, tactical delay to be a require-
ment but said nothing about the balancing test used in the circuit’s 
previous cases and failed to mention Sowa or Pardue.99 As the forego-
ing demonstrates, the Seventh Circuit still appears conflicted over 
the proper test.  
IV. THE STATES
 Many opinions on pre-accusation delay have been issued by the 
different U.S. Courts of Appeals since Marion and Lovasco, but an 
examination of how the states handle the issue is also important. Not 
all of the states can be categorized as cleanly as the circuits, but this 
Part nevertheless attempts to categorize the fifty states and dives 
into a further discussion of the approach followed by a handful of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 92. United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 93. See United States v. Hollins, 811 F.2d 384, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Within this 
circuit there is conflicting authority as to whether, after a showing of actual and 
substantial prejudice has been made by the defendant, the defendant then bears the 
additional burden of proving that the government delayed the indictment for a tactical 
advantage or some other impermissible purpose, or if the burden is then shifted to the 
government to show why the pre-indictment delay was necessary.” (citations omitted)); see 
also Hoo v. United States, 484 U.S. 1035, 1036 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (denial of cert.). 
 94. 34 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 95. See United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1512 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 96. See Sowa, 34 F.3d at 450. 
 97. Id. at 451. 
 98. See United States v. Pardue, 134 F.3d 1316, 1319 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 99. See United States v. Wallace, 326 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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those states.100 Significantly, while the individual protections provid-
ed by the U.S. Constitution establish a floor to which the states must 
adhere, it does not put a ceiling in place. Thus, states are free to pro-
vide greater protections under their own state constitutions.101
A.  States Using a Strict Two-Prong Approach 
 States that use a strict two-prong test requiring bad faith, an im-
proper purpose, harassment, deliberate action, or recklessness102 as a 
prong103 include: Alabama,104 Arizona,105 Arkansas,106 Connecticut,107
Georgia,108 Idaho,109 Indiana,110 Iowa,111 Kansas,112 Kentucky,113 Mary-
land,114 Massachusetts,115 Minnesota,116 Mississippi,117 Missouri,118 Ne-
braska,119 Nevada,120 New Jersey,121 New Mexico,122 North Carolina,123
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 100. In conducting searches on Westlaw to determine how each state approaches pre-
accusation delay cases, the author used the following search terms: (Marion or Lovasco) & 
(pre! /3 delay) & “due process”. 
 101. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 88 (2012). 
 102. A few states discussed in this section allow recklessness to meet part two of the 
test. Nonetheless, they have been placed in this category because they still adhere to a 
strict two-part test as opposed to a more lenient balancing test. 
 103. Actual prejudice is the other prong. Most of these states also require the actual 
prejudice to be substantial. 
 104. See infra pp. 673-74. 
 105. See, e.g., State v. Broughton, 752 P.2d 483, 486 (Ariz. 1988). 
 106. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 188 S.W.3d 921, 927-28 (Ark. 2004). 
 107. See, e.g., State v. Morrill, 498 A.2d 76, 86 (Conn. 1985) (“In order to establish a 
due process violation because of pre-accusation delay, the defendant must show both that 
actual substantial prejudice resulted from the delay and that the reasons for the  
delay were wholly unjustifiable, as where the state seeks to gain a tactical advantage over  
the defendant.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 614 S.E.2d 781, 783 (Ga. 2005). 
 109. See infra p. 674.  
 110. See infra p. 674. 
 111. See infra pp. 674-75. 
 112. See, e.g., State v. Crume, 22 P.3d 1057, 1062 (Kan. 2001). 
 113. See, e.g., Kirk v. Commonwealth, 6 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Ky. 1999). The Kentucky 
Supreme Court has interpreted Marion to require intentional, tactical delay. See Reed v. 
Commonwealth, 738 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ky. 1987). 
 114. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 774 A.2d 1136, 1156 (Md. 2001). 
 115. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Imbruglia, 387 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Mass. 1979). 
Recklessness will satisfy the second prong in Massachusetts. See, e.g., id.
 116. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 275 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Minn. 1978). The Minnesota 
Supreme Court has not evaluated pre-accusation delay cases in much depth. Nonetheless, 
it falls in this category because it interprets Lovasco to require intentional, tactical delay.  
See id. 
 117. See, e.g., Killen v. State, 05-KA-01393-SCT (¶ 69) (Miss. 2007). According to the 
Mississippi Supreme Court, it adopted the requirement of intentional delay from the 
United States Supreme Court. See id.
 118. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 621 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo. 1981). 
 119. See State v. Glazebrook, 803 N.W.2d 767, 777 (Neb. 2011). 
 120. See infra p. 675. 
 121. See State v. Townsend, 897 A.2d 316, 325 (N.J. 2006). New Jersey interprets the 
federal standard as requiring deliberate government action, and it appears to apply the 
same standard under state law as well. See id.
 122. See, e.g., Gonzales v. State, 805 P.2d 630, 632 (N.M. 1991). 
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Oklahoma,124 Pennsylvania,125 Rhode Island,126 Texas,127 Utah,128
Vermont,129 Virginia,130 Wisconsin,131 and Wyoming.132
 ALABAMA.  The Alabama Supreme Court does not appear to have 
encountered any cases that are on-point. The Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals, however, has reviewed a number of pre-accusation 
delay cases133 and has adopted the following position:
The law is well-settled that in order to establish a due process  
violation due to pre[-accusation] delay, a defendant must show  
(1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to the conduct of his de-
fense, and (2) that the delay was the product of deliberate action 
by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage. A de-
fendant is charged with a heavier burden of proof in showing a 
pre[-accusation] delay due process violation than in showing a de-
nial of his speedy trial rights.134
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 123. See, e.g., State v. Swann, 370 S.E.2d 533, 537 (N.C. 1988). 
 124. While Oklahoma’s position is not entirely evident, it does appear to require 
intentional, tactical delay. See Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1991) (“The delay 
in the present case was not a ‘tactical’ delay designed to impair the ability of the 
[defendant] to mount an effective defense.”). 
 125. See infra pp. 675-76. 
 126. See State v. Vanasse, 593 A.2d 58, 64 (R.I. 1991). 
 127. See, e.g., State v. Krizan-Wilson, 354 S.W.3d 808, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) 
(“[T]his Court . . . has held for more than two decades that, in order to establish a due-
process violation, [a defendant] has the burden of proving both prejudice and that an 
intentional delay was designed to give the state a tactical advantage.”). The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals has final appellate jurisdiction in state criminal cases in Texas. See
Court Structure of Texas, TEX. CTS. ONLINE, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/ (last updated 
Mar. 8, 2013). 
 128. See State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶¶ 42-49, 152 P.3d 321. In Hales, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that its previous cases on pre-accusation delay were inconsistent 
with regard to the proper test. Id. ¶ 45. As a result, it took the opportunity to clarify its 
position, stating that “[a]s a matter of federal law . . . the defendant [must] show (1) actual 
prejudice and (2) delay for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage or for another bad 
faith motive.” Id. ¶ 49.
 129. See State v. Beer, 2004 VT 99, ¶ 39, 177 Vt. 245, 864 A.2d 643, overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Brillon, 2008 VT 35, 183 Vt. 475, 955 A.2d 1108; see also State v. Ellis, 
542 A.2d 279, 282 (Vt. 1988) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that, to prove a 
violation of due process, the defendant must show both that he suffered actual prejudice to 
the conduct of his defense and that the delay was intentional and caused by a desire to 
gain tactical advantage.” (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971))). 
 130. See Morrisette v. Commonwealth, 569 S.E.2d 47, 52 (Va. 2002). 
 131. See, e.g., State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶ 45, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227.  
 132. See, e.g., Remmick v. State, 2012 WY 57, ¶ 16, 275 P.3d 467, 470 (Wyo. 2012). 
Significantly, “Wyoming has no statute of limitations for criminal offenses, and prosecution 
for such offenses may be commenced at any time during the life of the offender.” Id.
(quoting Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wyo. 1992)); see also Lindsey Powell, 
Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 147 (2008); Justin 
Daraie, Comment, Criminal Law—The Road Not Taken: Parameters of the Speedy Trial 
Right and How Due Process Can Limit Prosecutorial Delay; Humphrey v. State, 185 P.3d 
1236 (Wyo. 2008), 9 WYO. L. REV. 171, 189 (2009). 
 133. See, e.g., Craft v. State, 90 So. 3d 197 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).  
 134. See, e.g., State v. Prince, 581 So. 2d 874, 878 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The court of criminal appeals has suggested recklessness may satisfy 
the second prong in Alabama.135 With regard to the prejudice prong, 
the prejudice must be actual and substantial.136
IDAHO. In Idaho, the clear position is that “[b]efore a due process 
violation can be found, a defendant must show that the pre[-]accusation 
delay ‘. . . caused substantial prejudice to [defendants’] rights to a fair 
trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical ad-
vantage over the accused.’ ”137 Significantly, in State v. Wilbanks, the 
Idaho Supreme Court concluded that Marion requires this position.138
Moreover, Wilbanks was decided prior to Lovasco.139 Nonetheless, the 
Idaho Supreme Court maintained its pre-Lovasco position in later 
cases without considering the additional framework elicited by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Lovasco.140
INDIANA. The Indiana Supreme Court has not unequivocally 
asserted what it considers to be the proper test to utilize in adjudicat-
ing claims of pre-accusation delay. Nonetheless, it has used language 
indicating that it agrees with the strict bad-faith approach. In one of 
its on-point cases, the court found no due process violation, reasoning 
in part that the “defendant has not shown that the delay in his prose-
cution was a deliberate attempt by the State to gain unfair ad-
vantage.”141 In addition, at least one case decided in the Indiana Court 
of Appeals has stated that intentional, tactical delay is required.142
IOWA.  At first glance, Iowa appears to use a balancing test, but a 
further examination of relevant Iowa Supreme Court cases leads to a 
contrary conclusion. In State v. Trompeter, the court said that “[t]o 
prove a pre-accusatorial delay violated due process, the defendant 
must show: (1) the delay was unreasonable; and (2) the defendant’s 
defense was thereby prejudiced.”143 It further asserted that a balanc-
ing test must be undertaken.144 Interestingly, State v. Lange was one of 
the cases Trompeter cited to support its statement about the balancing 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 135. See Cherry v. State, 933 So. 2d 377, 380 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (“Lovasco
apparently includes evidence of ‘reckless disregard of circumstances known to the 
prosecution . . .’ ” (quoting Stoner v. State, 418 So. 2d 171, 181 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982))). 
 136. Prince, 581 So. 2d at 878.  
 137. State v. Murphy, 584 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 1978) (quoting United States v. 
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971)); see also State v. Kruse, 606 P.2d 981, 983 (Idaho 1980).  
 138. See 509 P.2d 331, 336 (Idaho 1973). 
 139. Wilbanks was decided in 1973 and Lovasco was decided in 1977. 
 140. See cases cited supra note 137. 
 141. Crawford v. State, 669 N.E.2d 141, 147 (Ind. 1996). 
 142. See Marshall v. State, 832 N.E.2d 615, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
 143. 555 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1996). State v. Brown modified the holding in 
Trompeter, but it seems to have only done so by imposing what the court called a “more 
manageable statement,” one that now looks at whether there is actual prejudice before 
determining whether the delay was unreasonable. 656 N.W.2d 355, 363 & n.6 (Iowa 2003). 
 144. Trompeter, 555 N.W.2d at 470. 
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test.145 Lange, however, also stated another proposition that seems to 
be at odds with conducting a balancing test. Regarding the actual 
prejudice prong, the court in Lange stated that “[t]he actual prejudice 
must result from the State’s ‘intentional attempt to gain a tactical 
advantage by delaying the initiation of charges.’ ”146 Therefore, Iowa 
has been placed in this category.  
NEVADA. In Nevada, proving a due process violation based on 
pre-accusation delay requires a showing of bad faith. Specifically, a 
defendant must demonstrate “(1) that he or she suffered actual, non-
speculative prejudice from the delay; and (2) that the prosecution in-
tentionally delayed bringing the charges in order to gain a tactical 
advantage over the [defendant], or that the prosecution delayed in 
bad faith.”147 Interestingly, the Nevada Supreme Court cited two cas-
es in support of this strict, two-prong test: Lovasco and DeGeorge.148
Obviously, that is not the clear holding of Lovasco.149 More important-
ly, however, DeGeorge is a Ninth Circuit case, and like in other Ninth 
Circuit cases, the court applied a balancing test rather than adopting 
a strict bad-faith requirement.150 Moreover, throughout its discussion, 
the Nevada Supreme Court also cited other Ninth Circuit cases to 
support its contrary analysis.151
PENNSYLVANIA.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed 
pre-accusation delay at length in Commonwealth v. Snyder,152 and 
subsequently built upon that discussion in Commonwealth v. 
Scher.153 Claims of pre-accusation delay in Pennsylvania are analyzed 
in the same manner under the federal and state constitutions.154 The 
court in Scher recognized: 
[A] two-prong test emerged from Marion and Lovasco to establish 
a due process claim for pre-[accusation] delay: (1) the defendant 
must show actual prejudice from the delay, and (2) prejudice alone 
is not sufficient to show a violation of due process where the delay 
was due to the government’s continuing investigation of the crime.155
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 145. See id.; see also State v. Lange, 531 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1995). 
 146. Lange, 531 N.W.2d at 111 (quoting State v. Wagner, 410 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Iowa 1987)). 
 147. Wyman v. State, 217 P.3d 572, 578 (Nev. 2009) (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 
U.S. 783, 784 (1977); United States v. DeGeorge, 380 F.3d 1203, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 148. See cases cited supra note 147. 
 149. See generally Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783. 
 150. See DeGeorge, 380 F.3d at 1210; see also supra Part III.C. 
 151. See Wyman, 217 P.3d at 579. 
 152. 713 A.2d 596 (Pa. 1998). 
 153. 803 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 2002). 
 154. See id. at 1215 (“[W]ith respect to claims of violation of due process caused by pre-
arrest delay, ‘our analysis is the same pursuant to both due process clauses.’ ” (quoting 
Snyder, 713 A.2d at 602)). 
 155. Id. at 1217. 
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As the court proceeded, it further clarified that negligence alone will 
not violate due process and instead required the defendant to show 
intentional conduct, bad faith, or recklessness by the government.156
B.  States that Reject the Strict Two-Prong Test 
 States that reject the strict two-prong test include: Alaska,157 Cali-
fornia,158 Florida,159 Hawaii,160 Illinois,161 Louisiana,162 Maine,163 Mon-
tana,164 New Hampshire,165 North Dakota,166 Ohio,167 Oregon,168 South 
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 156. See id. at 1221-22 (“We agree with this rationale that negligence or due diligence 
in the conduct of a criminal investigation is not the appropriate standard for deciding 
whether delay in indictment deprives a defendant of due process. As a result, the test that 
we believe is the correct one must take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the case, including: the deference that courts must afford to the prosecutor’s 
conclusions that a case is not ripe for prosecution; the limited resources available to law 
enforcement agencies when conducting a criminal investigation; the prosecutor’s motives in 
delaying indictment, and; the degree to which the defendant’s own actions contributed to 
the delay. Therefore, to clarify the standard established in Snyder, we hold . . . the 
defendant must first show that the delay caused him actual prejudice, that is, substantially 
impaired his or her ability to defend against the charges. The court must then examine all 
of the circumstances to determine the validity of the Commonwealth’s reasons for the 
delay. Only in situations where the evidence shows that the delay was the product of 
intentional, bad faith, or reckless conduct by the prosecution, however, will we find a 
violation of due process. Negligence in the conduct of a criminal investigation, without 
more, will not be sufficient to prevail on a due process claim based on pre-arrest delay.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 157. See infra p. 677. 
 158. See infra pp. 677-78. 
 159. See infra pp. 678-79. 
 160. See, e.g., State v. Higa, 74 P.3d 6, 10 (Haw. 2003). 
 161. See People v. Lawson, 367 N.E.2d 1244, 1248 (Ill. 1977) (“[T]he defendant must 
come forward with a clear showing of actual and substantial prejudice. . . . If the 
[defendant] satisfies the trial court that he or she has been substantially prejudiced by the 
delay, then the burden shifts to the State to show the reasonableness, if not the necessity, 
of the delay.”). In Lawson, the court denied the State’s petition for rehearing, but in doing 
so, it issued a supplemental opinion to address Lovasco, which was released shortly after 
the initial Lawson opinion. The court’s position remained the same. See id. at 1249 (“The 
court’s conduct of the inquiry requires the defendant to come forward with a clear 
demonstration of actual and substantial prejudice before the State presents a showing of 
reasonableness. The court then balances the competing interests. This is consistent with 
the Lovasco requirement of a demonstration of prejudice to the defendant and an inquiry into 
the reasonableness of the delay.”). Even though the Illinois Supreme Court clearly announced 
its position in Lawson, at least one intermediate appellate court in Illinois has failed to 
follow the supreme court. See People v. Totzke, 974 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
 162. See, e.g., State v. Schrader, 518 So. 2d 1024, 1028 (La. 1988). 
 163. See, e.g., State v. Rippy, 626 A.2d 334, 338 (Me. 1993) (“[T]he defendant must first 
demonstrate ‘actual and unjustifiable prejudice’ resulting from the delay. Only then do we 
inquire as to the reasons for the delay offered by the State and determine, whether, on 
balance, the delay remains unjustified.” (citations omitted)). 
 164. See, e.g., State v. Passmore, 2010 MT 34, ¶ 29, 355 Mont. 187, 225 P.3d 1229. In 
Montana, negligence can be considered, but when courts conduct the balancing test, 
negligence is not weighed as heavily as deliberate government action. Id.
 165. See, e.g., State v. Knickerbocker, 880 A.2d 419, 423 (N.H. 2005). 
 166. See, e.g., State v. Denny, 351 N.W.2d 102, 104 (N.D. 1984). Significantly though, 
while the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the requirement of actual prejudice in 
Denny, it did not find actual prejudice, but proceeded to “balance[] the reasonableness of 
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Carolina,169 Washington,170 and West Virginia.171 Most of these states 
use a balancing test after finding actual prejudice.
ALASKA. Alaska has not explicitly adopted a balancing test, but 
it has rejected the strict approach used by the majority of federal and 
state courts. Under state law in Alaska, a successful claim requires 
proving unreasonable delay and actual prejudice.172 The state must 
provide reasons for the delay, but the defendant has the burden of 
establishing prejudice and that the state’s justifications were unrea-
sonable.173 In a previous case, Alaska notably considered this test to 
be the proper analysis under the United States Constitution as 
well.174 While Alaska did not explicitly adopt a balancing test in Gon-
zales,175 it did expressly reject the strict bad-faith approach.176 How-
ever, Alaska’s inquiry looks into the reasonableness of the delay be-
fore considering actual prejudice; this seems to indicate that if any-
thing is to be balanced, it is only whether the government’s reason(s) 
fall on the side of reasonable or unreasonable rather than how they 
balance against the actual prejudice where prejudice is found. 
CALIFORNIA. Similar to the Nevada Supreme Court, albeit with 
a different result, the California Supreme Court has, to a certain de-
gree, deviated from the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the law gov-
erning pre-accusation delay. Pursuant to the California Constitution, 
California courts first require actual prejudice.177 Upon a finding of 
actual prejudice, the prosecution is asked to provide reasons to justify 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the delay against the alleged prejudice” anyway. Id. at 105. Even if it did so mistakenly, it 
seems pretty clear that North Dakota’s intent is to follow the same approach as the other 
balancing states. See id.; see also State v. Weisz, 356 N.W.2d 462, 464 (N.D. 1984) (“The 
reasonableness of the delay must be balanced against the prejudice to the accused.”).  
 167. See infra p. 679. 
 168. See State v. Stokes, 248 P.3d 953, 960-64 (Or. 2011). 
 169. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 653 S.E.2d 259, 260 (S.C. 2007). Like Wyoming, South 
Carolina has no statutes of limitation for criminal offenses. See Powell, supra note 132,  
at 147. 
 170. See infra pp. 679-81. 
 171. See, e.g., State ex rel. Knotts v. Facemire, 678 S.E.2d 847, 856 (W. Va. 2009). 
 172. State v. Gonzales, 156 P.3d 407, 411 (Alaska 2007). 
 173. Id. at 412. 
 174. See Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Alaska 1980) (“Two factors are to be 
considered under both federal and state law: (1) the reasonableness of the delay and (2) the 
resulting harm to the accused.” (quoting Coffey v. State, 585 P.2d 514, 519 (Alaska 1978))). 
Unlike Burke, Gonzales only mentions “[s]tate due process challenges” when it introduces 
the same two-part test used in Burke. See Gonzales, 156 P.3d at 411. 
 175. See generally Gonzales, 156 P.3d 407.   
 176. See id. at 411 n.23 (“The state argues that we should explicitly adopt the 
prevailing standard in most federal jurisdictions: a presumption that the state is acting 
reasonably in cases of delay unless the defendant can show that the state is acting in bad 
faith. We decline to adopt that approach at this time.”). 
 177. See, e.g., People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 1074, 1101 (Cal. 2010); People v. Nelson, 185 
P.3d 49, 54 (Cal. 2008). 
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the delay.178 Finally, California courts balance the prejudice to the 
defendant and the prosecution’s justifications.179 Moreover,  
[u]nder the California standard, “negligent, as well as purposeful, 
delay in bringing charges may, when accompanied by a showing of 
prejudice, violate due process. This does not mean, however, that 
whether the delay was purposeful or negligent is irrelevant.” Ra-
ther, “whether the delay was purposeful or negligent is relevant to 
the balancing process. Purposeful delay to gain advantage is total-
ly unjustified, and a relatively weak showing of prejudice would 
suffice to tip the scales towards finding a due process violation. If 
the delay was merely negligent, a greater showing of prejudice 
would be required to establish a due process violation.” The justifi-
cation for the delay is strong when there is “investigative delay, 
nothing else.”180
The California Supreme Court’s handling of these cases is significant 
because, despite acknowledging federal law on the topic “is not en-
tirely settled,”181 the court appears to be under the impression that 
the United States Constitution requires a showing of intentional, tac-
tical delay or bad faith.182 Thus, it seems to follow the same approach 
as the Ninth Circuit on state law grounds; ironically, however, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court appears to disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of federal law.  
FLORIDA. In Rogers v. State, the Florida Supreme Court  
approved use of the Townley test in pre-accusation delay cases, a  
test Florida’s First District Court of Appeal previously adopted in 
Howell v. State.183 Specifically, 
[w]hen a defendant asserts a due process violation based on pre[-
accusation] delay, he bears the initial burden of showing actual 
prejudice. . . . If the defendant meets this initial burden, the court 
then must balance the demonstrable reasons for delay against the 
gravity of the particular prejudice on a case-by-case basis. The out-
come turns on whether the delay violates the fundamental concep-
tion of justice, decency and fair play embodied in the Bill of Rights 
and fourteenth amendment.184
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 178. See cases cited supra note 177. 
 179. See cases cited supra note 177. 
 180. Cowan, 236 P.3d at 1101 (citations omitted). 
 181. Nelson, 185 P.3d at 55. 
 182. See id. (“Regarding the federal constitutional standard, we have stated that ‘[a] 
claim based upon the federal Constitution also requires a showing that the delay was 
undertaken to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant.’ ” (quoting People v. Catlin, 26 
P.3d 357, 373 (Cal. 2001))). 
 183. See Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 531 (Fla. 1987); Howell v. State, 418 So. 2d 
1164, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). 
 184. Rogers, 511 So. 2d at 531; see also United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 581-82 
(5th Cir. 1982); Howell, 418 So. 2d at 1170. 
2013] PRE-ACCUSATION DELAY 679
Even though Townley is no longer good law in the Fifth Circuit,185
the Townley test remains the correct test in Florida.186 The First  
District Court of Appeal recently noted in Hope that Overton and  
Rivera—decided eleven years and two years, respectively, after 
Crouch—continued to apply the Townley test that was adopted in 
Howell and Rogers.187 Significantly, neither Overton nor Rivera noted 
that the Townley test was subsequently rejected by the en banc Fifth 
Circuit in Crouch.188
OHIO. Ohio’s approach resembles the general balancing approach. 
State v. Luck is a leading Ohio case on pre-accusation delay.189 In 
Luck, the court recognized that actual prejudice is a prerequisite if 
one is to succeed with a claim of pre-accusation delay.190 However, it 
held that determining at trial whether a defendant was actually 
prejudiced by the delay requires balancing the asserted prejudice 
against other admissible evidence.191 If actual prejudice is found, the 
second part of the test from Lovasco then requires finding no justifia-
ble reasons for the delay.192 Of course, deliberate delay is an unjusti-
fiable reason.193 In Ohio, however, negligence and error in judgment 
by the state are also unjustifiable if the state stops investigating and 
subsequently chooses to prosecute without obtaining additional evi-
dence.194 When negligence or error in judgment constitutes the reason 
for the delay, “[t]he length of delay will normally be the key factor in 
determining whether” it was justifiable.195 At least one appellate case 
in Ohio has interpreted Luck to mean “court[s] must balance the prej-
udice suffered by the accused with the state’s reason for the delay.”196
WASHINGTON.  State v. Calderon197 marked the first time the 
Washington Supreme Court reviewed pre-accusation delay following 
Lovasco.198 In Calderon, the court reiterated that demonstrating 
prejudice is required to prove the delay violated a defendant’s due 
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 185. See supra Part III.A. 
 186. See State v. Hope, 89 So. 3d 1132, 1136-37 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); see also Overton v. 
State, 976 So. 2d 536, 560 (Fla. 2007); Rivera v. State, 717 So. 2d 477, 483 (Fla. 1998). 
 187. Hope, 89 So. 3d at 1136-37. 
 188. See generally Overton, 976 So. 2d 536; Rivera, 717 So. 2d 477.  
 189. See 472 N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio 1984). 
 190. See id. at 1102. 
 191. Id. at 1102, 1104. Specifically, in Luck, the court stated that “[t]he prejudicial 
factors enumerated by defense counsel (the deaths of witnesses, the fading of memories, 
and the loss of evidence), when balanced against the other admissible evidence in this case, 
show that the defendant has suffered actual prejudice by the fifteen-year delay in 
prosecution.” Id. at 1104. 
 192. Id. at 1105. 
 193. See id.
 194. Id.
 195. Id.
 196. State v. Glazer, 677 N.E.2d 368, 370 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
 197. 684 P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1984), modified by State v. Oppelt, 257 P.3d 653 (Wash. 2011).
 198. See Oppelt, 257 P.3d at 656. 
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process rights and that the inquiry requires consideration of the 
prejudice and the reasons for the delay.199 According to the court, “[i]f 
the [government] is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake 
a further balancing of the [government]’s interest and the prejudice to  
the [defendant].”200
In Oppelt, the court upheld the general approach it applied in 
Calderon and agreed that a balancing test should be used as the final 
step.201 The court, however, slightly modified its Calderon holding; it 
clarified that the due process test requires balancing, irrespective of 
whether the government’s reasons for the delay are justified.202 Thus,
[t]he test, simply stated, is that (1) the defendant must show actu-
al prejudice from the delay; (2) if the defendant shows prejudice, 
the court must determine the [government’s] reasons for the delay; 
(3) the court must then weigh the reasons and the prejudice to de-
termine whether fundamental conceptions of justice would be vio-
lated by allowing prosecution.203
The court recognized that Washington courts have advanced conflict-
ing interpretations of what must be balanced.204 As a result, it clarified 
that the reasons for the delay and the resulting prejudice must be bal-
anced against each other.205 On the other hand, the delay itself and 
the government’s interest are not balanced against the prejudice.206
 The Oppelt court also discussed its rationale for proceeding with 
its three-part test, which concluded with the balancing prong.207 It 
stated that the distinct, bright-line approaches urged by the parties 
confused the proper analytical framework to apply “in answering the 
core question of whether the government action violates fundamental 
conceptions of justice.”208 According to the court, mere negligence 
could result in a due process violation, but to survive the balancing 
test, the prejudice would have to be greater than that required in a 
case involving deliberate delay or bad faith.209 The court voiced its 
agreement with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, which have also stat-
ed that “negligent delay can violate due process.”210 Moreover, it stated 
that answering whether government behavior “violates fundamental 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 199. Calderon, 684 P.2d at 1296. 
 200. Id. (citing United States v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 201. See Oppelt, 257 P.3d at 656-60. 
 202. See id.
 203. Id. at 659. 
 204. Id.
 205. Id.
 206. See id.
 207. See id. at 657-59. 
 208. Id. at 658. 
 209. Id. at 658, 660. 
 210. Id. at 658. 
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conceptions of justice . . . does not necessarily turn on the intent of 
the government actors.”211
C.  States Without a Clear Position 
 The States discussed in this section cannot be appropriately placed 
into either of the two main categories, as their positions are unclear. 
COLORADO. Colorado’s approach is unclear due to the inconsist-
encies in its case law on pre-accusation delay. In People v. Small, the 
court asserted that a successful claim requires proving actual preju-
dice and “[i]ntentional or negligent misconduct” by the government.212
The Small court did not mention balancing in its due process analy-
sis, however;213 it only did so in its discussion of speedy trial.214 Still, 
despite the court’s willingness to consider negligent misconduct in 
Small, the Colorado Supreme Court had previously stated in People
v. Hutchinson that “mere displeasure . . . with a delay in the district 
attorney’s issuance of the arrest warrant does not justify the dismis-
sal of charges against the defendant, at least in the absence of a 
showing that the delay was an intentional device to gain a tactical 
advantage.”215 Furthermore, in discussing a similar issue in People v. 
McClure, the Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis muddied the waters 
with respect to what it considers to be the proper test by making in-
tentional, tactical delay a mere factor—as opposed to a requirement.216
DELAWARE.  In Preston v. State, a pre-Lovasco case, the Delaware 
Supreme Court interpreted Marion to require actual and substantial 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 211. Id.
 212. 631 P.2d 148, 157 (Colo. 1981). 
 213. See generally id.
 214. See id. at 154-56.
 215. 557 P.2d 376, 377 (Colo. 1976). Unlike Small, Hutchinson was decided before 
Lovasco, but both cases appear to be good law. 
 216. See generally 756 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1988). In McClure, the Colorado Supreme Court 
used an approach similar to the one it used in People v. Hall, 729 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1986). 
The court stated the following in Hall:
     Unlike the right to a speedy trial, there is no constitutional right to a speedy 
arrest. However, a point can be reached where the delay is so great that the 
prejudice to the defendant caused by it—due to faded memories of parties  
and witnesses, loss of contact with witnesses, and loss of documents—becomes 
so great that due process and fundamental fairness require that the charges  
be dismissed.  
     This court has recognized “certain key factors” to be examined in this 
inquiry, which include: (1) loss of defense witnesses; (2) whether the delay was 
purposeful and intended to prejudice the defendant; (3) the kind and quantum 
of evidence available to the prosecution; and (4) general considerations of 
justice and fair play. This list is not exhaustive. 
Id. at 375 (citations omitted). Both McClure and Hall followed the court’s approach in People 
ex rel. Coca v. District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, 530 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1975).   
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prejudice or intentional, tactical delay.217 In a 1990 case, the court 
issued an order that cited Preston in stating that same disjunctive 
proposition.218 A few months later, the court issued another order 
that also cited Preston; this time, however, the court only stated that 
“[t]o prevail on the issue of pre-[accusation] delay, a defendant must 
show that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the de-
lay.”219 Where Delaware stands today is unclear, but as discussed 
above, actual prejudice is necessary—but not sufficient—to bring a 
successful claim of pre-accusation delay, at least under federal law.220
MICHIGAN.  The path followed in Michigan is unclear, as the 
Michigan Supreme Court has not yet adjudicated a claim of pre-
accusation delay on the merits. It had the opportunity to do so in 
People v. Mercer but chose not to.221 Instead, it remanded the case on 
other grounds.222 The dissent vehemently objected to the majority’s 
decision to avoid the issue.223 As the dissent stated,  
I would address [this] jurisprudentially significant issue . . . . By 
failing to resolve this issue, this Court will potentially subject de-
fendant to an unfair trial. . . . Further, by evading the opportunity to 
resolve the proper standard applicable to similar pre[-accusation] 
delay cases, this Court potentially subjects many more defendants 
in this state to stale, unfair prosecutions.224
The dissent also noted the split among federal and state courts and that 
panels on the Michigan Court of Appeals have applied different tests.225
NEW YORK. New York initially appeared to reject the strict two-
prong test, but developments in New York case law are unclear with 
regard to whether that is still true today. Nevertheless, the majority 
and dissenting opinions in People v. Vernace are instructive on New 
York’s treatment of pre-accusation delay claims under state law. At 
first glance, New York seemingly analyzes these claims in a marked-
ly similar manner to speedy trial claims.226 Specifically, New York 
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 217. 338 A.2d 562, 567 (Del. 1975). 
 218. See Watts v. State, No. 183,1989, 1990 WL 38279, at *2 (Del. 1990). According to 
the 1984 commentary to Rule 17 of the Delaware Supreme Court rules, orders of the 
Delaware Supreme Court can be cited as precedent in Delaware courts.  
 219. Ellington v. State, No. 369,1989, 1990 WL 84694, at *1 (Del. 1990). 
 220. See supra text accompanying note 28.  
 221. See 752 N.W.2d 470, 470 (Mich. 2008). 
 222. See id.
 223. See id. at 471-74 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 224. Id. at 471 (emphasis added). 
 225. Id. at 473. A law review article has discussed pre-accusation delay and how it is 
examined by Michigan courts, see Thomas E. Brennan, Jr., Dismissal and Prearraignment 
Delay: Time Is of the Essence, 4 COOLEY L. REV. 493, 500-02 (1987), but much time has 
passed since the publication of that article. 
 226. See People v. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 2001) (“In this State, ‘we have 
never drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards’ when 
dealing with delays in prosecution. Indeed, the factors utilized to determine if a defendant’s 
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“[c]ourts must engage in a sensitive weighing process of [five] diversi-
fied factors.”227 Those factors are: “ ‘(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the 
reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge;  
(4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial in-
carceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the 
defense has been impaired by reason of the delay.’ ”228 However, de-
spite using this test—one with factors instead of requirements—the 
court in Vernace echoed the sentiment that “a determination made in 
good faith to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive 
[a] defendant of due process even though there may be some preju-
dice to [the] defendant.”229 The dissent, however, opined: 
Our case law is well-settled with respect to the effect of such inor-
dinate pre-accusatory prosecutorial delay. In contrast to the hold-
ings of the Supreme Court of the United States under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the 14th Amendment, we view an unjustified, pro-
tracted pre-indictment delay in prosecution . . . as a deprivation of 
a defendant’s State constitutional right to due process, without re-
quiring a showing of actual prejudice. 
     Our settled case law also holds that “[w]here there has been a 
prolonged delay, we impose a burden on the prosecution to estab-
lish good cause.”230
Still, in light of the majority opinion, New York’s case law does not 
appear to be entirely settled.  
SOUTH DAKOTA.  South Dakota’s approach cannot be definitively 
categorized. In State v. Stock, which appears to offer a better discus-
sion of pre-accusation delay than any other South Dakota Supreme 
Court case, the court did not mention anything about balancing.231 It 
also seemed to stray away from the approach of the states that re-
quire deliberate or reckless action, but it did not do so in a manner 
that is strong enough to suggest it rejects the strict two-prong test.232
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rights have been abridged are the same whether the right asserted is a speedy trial right or 
the due process right to prompt prosecution.” (citations omitted)); see also Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514 (1972) (discussing the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment).  
 227. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d at 67. 
 228. People v. Decker, 912 N.E.2d 1041, 1042-43 (N.Y. 2009) (quoting People v. 
Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d 303, 306 (N.Y. 1975)); see also Vernace, 756 N.E.2d at 67. 
 229. 756 N.E.2d at 68 (citing People v. Singer, 376 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1978)). 
 230. Id. at 68-69 (Levine, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 231. See generally 361 N.W.2d 280 (S.D. 1985). 
 232. See id. at 284 (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that preaccusatorial delay by the 
state will routinely be held not to result in due process violations. We agree with the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that ‘[e]ven the legitimate excuse of a continuing undercover 
investigation may be stretched to the breaking point; at some point, the accused’s right to 
due process of law must prevail.’ Moreover, we hold that the burden of establishing 
justification for preaccusatorial delay rests squarely upon the state.” (citations omitted)). 
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TENNESSEE. Tennessee’s overall position is unclear, as it seems 
to alter its test for pre-accusation delay cases depending on certain 
circumstances. In State v. Dykes, the court of criminal appeals said 
obtaining relief requires “prov[ing] that (a) there was a delay, (b) the 
accused sustained actual prejudice as a direct and proximate result of 
the delay, and (c) the State caused the delay in order to gain tactical 
advantage over or to harass the accused.”233 Almost six years later, in 
State v. Gray, the Tennessee Supreme Court found Dykes “to be in-
apposite” under Gray’s facts.234 The court found Gray to be different 
because it involved a delay of forty-two years, rather than only one 
year like in Dykes.235 In addition, the court reasoned Dykes was dis-
tinguishable because, in that case, “the State had knowledge of the 
offense from the time of commission. In the instant case there was no 
such knowledge.”236 The court further stated: 
[T]he Marion-Dykes approach . . . places a daunting, almost in-
surmountable, burden on the accused by requiring a demonstra-
tion not only that the delay has caused prejudice but also that the 
State orchestrated the delay in order to obtain a tactical ad-
vantage. Thus, under the facts before us, application of so strin-
gent a standard would force a result we would consider unconstitu-
tional, unwarranted, and unfair. To accomplish justice while pre-
serving Gray’s right to a fair trial requires, in our view, a less  
stringent standard. 
Today we articulate a standard by which to evaluate pre-
accusatorial delay and hold that an untimely prosecution may be 
subject to dismissal upon Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due 
process grounds and under Article I, §§ 8 and 9, of the Tennessee 
Constitution even though in the interim the defendant was neither 
formally accused, restrained, nor incarcerated for the offense. In 
determining whether pre-accusatorial delay violates due process, 
the trial court must consider the length of the delay, the reason for 
the delay, and the degree of prejudice, if any, to the accused.237
 About a year and a half later, the court further expounded upon 
its standard in State v. Utley.238 Lingering questions, however, led the 
court to return to the topic in State v. Carico shortly thereafter to 
clarify where it stood in light of Dykes, Gray, and Utley.239 It noted that 
“Utley . . . limited the test adopted in Gray to cases in which the State 
had no knowledge that a criminal offense had been committed.”240
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Furthermore, “[a]s recognized in Utley, a showing that ‘the delay was 
an intentional device to gain a tactical advantage over the [defend-
ant]’ is a significant factor in determining if the defendant’s due pro-
cess rights have been violated.”241 Thus, where Tennessee stands, in a 
sense, varies case by case.  
V. A FURTHER ANALYSIS OF PRE-ACCUSATION DELAY AND A CALL FOR 
SUPREME COURT ACTION
 As it currently stands, successfully proving that pre-accusation 
delay caused a violation of a defendant’s rights under the Due Pro-
cess Clause is difficult in both federal and state courts.242 It is hard to 
imagine that the Supreme Court envisioned it being so difficult when 
the Court established the protection. Although proving this constitu-
tional violation is not easy, a test that does not require intentional, 
tactical delay or bad faith still likely results in the extra occasional 
dismissal for defendants who were greatly prejudiced by the delay—
quite possibly innocent defendants. With actual prejudice being a 
prerequisite to that dismissal under nearly any test, the defendant is 
already faced with a heavy burden.243 Perhaps that burden of proving 
actual prejudice is not nearly enough though, and the conduct of gov-
ernment actors (i.e., the police and/or the prosecution) matters. As 
discussed in this Note, every federal circuit and almost every state 
has spoken on this issue,244 but the Supreme Court has not addressed 
it since 1977.245 The time has come. This Part will further explore 
pre-accusation delay and advocate that the Supreme Court reconsid-
er the issue, and ultimately decide what it holds to be the proper test 
for adjudicating these claims.  
 Existing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue has unequivo-
cally stated that the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause has 
distinct purposes from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
and is thus inapplicable in the pre-accusation delay context.246 State 
courts in New York have nevertheless chosen to apply the speedy tri-
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al test to these due process claims.247 In addition, courts in other 
states have drawn parallels between the two constitutional protec-
tions, and at least one law review article has done the same.248 This is 
in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has expressly stated that 
a defendant’s rights with regard to pre-accusation delay under the 
Due Process Clause are different from her Sixth Amendment speedy 
trial rights in multiple ways: 
In our view, however, the Sixth Amendment speedy trial provision 
has no application until the putative defendant in some way be-
comes an “accused” . . . . 
. . . On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only 
when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those 
persons who have been “accused” in the course of that prosecution. 
These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not 
yet accused . . . .249
. . . The framers could hardly have selected less appropriate lan-
guage if they had intended the speedy trial provision to protect 
against pre-accusation delay. . . .250
. . . . 
 It is apparent also that very little support for appellees’ posi-
tion emerges from a consideration of the purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment’s speedy trial provision . . . .251
. . . [Therefore, the] possibility of prejudice at trial is not itself suffi-
cient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper con-
text.252
 The Supreme Court’s pronouncements currently make drawing 
parallels between the two provisions inappropriate, at least under 
federal law. The above language from Marion demonstrates that the 
Supreme Court was unwavering in stating that the analysis under 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments should remain separated from one 
another in this context. Additionally, while not restating the exact 
same language verbatim in United States v. Lovasco, the Supreme 
Court still strongly reiterated the difference between the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights at play.253 Whether examining the two con-
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stitutional protections side-by-side should be appropriate is another 
matter. Only if the Supreme Court chose to retreat from its earlier, 
robust differentiation of the two rights would it be proper for courts 
to compare them in choosing which test to implement. This does not 
mean a balancing test is inappropriate to use in analyzing these due 
process claims; it only means that speedy trial jurisprudence is an 
inappropriate area of law from which to adopt such a balancing test. 
 Aside from policy considerations,254 one of the primary distinctions 
between pre-accusation delay claims and speedy trial claims is that 
the former, unlike the latter, has “other mechanisms [e.g., statutes of 
limitation] to guard against possible as distinguished from actual 
prejudice.”255 While generally true, this is not always the case. For 
example, no statutes of limitation exist for any criminal offenses 
committed in Wyoming and South Carolina.256 Similarly, Kentucky,257
North Carolina,258 and West Virginia259 do not have statutes of limita-
tion in place for any felonies. In addition, prosecutions of certain of-
fenses, including capital offenses, are not affected by statutes of limi-
tation.260 Perhaps the speedy trial balancing test elicited in Barker v. 
Wingo261 should apply to claims of pre-accusation delay when crimi-
nal offenses do not have any applicable statute of limitations. Per-
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haps another test that presumes prejudice after a certain period of 
time should be adopted under those circumstances. Whatever the an-
swer is, it is one that must come from the Supreme Court.  
 In Marion and Lovasco, the Court addressed pre-accusation delay 
claims where applicable statutes of limitation also existed. Marion
involved charges of fraudulent business practices,262 and the indict-
ment in that case was brought prior to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations.263 Lovasco involved charges of possession of stolen fire-
arms and dealing in firearms without a license.264 The delay in filing 
the indictment was approximately a year and a half,265 meaning it 
was filed before the five-year statute of limitations expired.266 Thus, 
at the very least, the Supreme Court should once again take up this 
issue of pre-accusation delay to address what should happen when the 
due process claim is asserted in conjunction with a case lacking an ap-
plicable statute of limitations. As one law review article stressed, 
without applicable statutes of limitation, “the Due Process Clause be-
comes the sole means of shielding an accused from prejudicial delay.”267
 Determining which test is more appropriate for analyzing pre-
accusation delay claims under the Due Process Clause and which test 
better flows from the language in Marion and Lovasco is not an easy 
task. Clearly it has confused many courts, which have adopted inter-
pretations all over the map.268 Starting with the prejudice prong, it is 
well-established that, at least under federal law, actual prejudice is 
required. This is another way in which one’s due process rights against 
pre-accusation delay are manifestly different from one’s speedy trial 
rights. In the former, actual prejudice is necessary but not suffi-
cient.269 In the latter, prejudice is neither necessary nor sufficient.270
 With pre-accusation delay, some courts require “actual, substan-
tial prejudice,” while other courts merely require “actual prejudice”; 
but through and through, the applications of both sets of courts seem 
to be markedly similar with respect to the prejudice prong. They all 
require prejudice that is clear-cut and non-speculative—essentially 
prejudice on steroids. Having the Supreme Court clarify some details 
surrounding prejudice in relation to pre-accusation delay would cer-
tainly provide some much needed guidance to lower courts. After all, 
approximately thirty-five years have passed since Lovasco. And while 
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the Supreme Court could not concretely state what constituted prej-
udice then, because only five or six years had passed since Marion,271
it could likely do so now due to the much larger period of time that 
has passed and the thousands of additional cases on pre-accusation 
delay that have emerged from lower courts in that period. 
 Where the gap really comes into play with regard to courts’ inter-
pretations of Marion and Lovasco, though, is how those courts exam-
ine the government’s reasons for the delay,272 typically under prong 
two of the due process test for pre-accusation delay.273 As discussed 
above, after finding actual prejudice, “consider[ing] the reasons for 
the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused” is also necessary.274
In addition, for a due process violation to occur, the delay must “vio-
late[] those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base 
of our civil and political institutions,’ and which define ‘the communi-
ty’s sense of fair play and decency.’ ”275 No party would dispute that 
an intentional, tactical delay satisfies prong two, something the gov-
ernment even conceded in Marion.276 As a result, it is puzzling why 
some courts do not recognize that recklessness should also satisfy 
prong two. After all, in Lovasco, the government renewed its conces-
sion from Marion and made the additional concession that “[a] due 
process violation might also be made out upon a showing of prosecu-
torial delay incurred in reckless disregard of circumstances, known to 
the prosecution, suggesting that there existed an appreciable risk 
that delay would impair the ability to mount an effective defense.”277
It should not matter that the Supreme Court recognized the govern-
ment’s new concession regarding recklessness by footnote. 
 While recklessness should surely be recognized as an improper 
reason, the more problematic question is whether negligence should 
also be deemed improper and whether prong two should entail a bal-
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ancing test over the stricter approach. Negligence is without a doubt 
unlike legitimate investigative delay. Moreover, a balancing test that 
recognizes negligence as improper is certainly the fairer approach for 
defendants raising these due process claims.278 In addition, courts 
that employ these balancing tests, which take negligence into ac-
count, have asserted that negligence is assigned less weight than bad 
faith or recklessness,279 which should at least put advocates of the 
stricter bad-faith approach somewhat at ease. Nevertheless, only the 
Supreme Court can properly inform us whether a balancing test is 
the most appropriate approach and whether it is in line with Marion
and Lovasco.
VI. CONCLUSION
 The Due Process Clause issue of pre-accusation delay is ripe for 
Supreme Court review. Marion and Lovasco, the leading cases in this 
area of law, were both decided in the 1970s. Since that time, the Su-
preme Court has not decided any cases dealing with the identical 
pre-accusation delay issue. On the other hand, every U.S. Court of 
Appeals and courts of almost every state have weighed in since then. 
This Note not only updates the positions of the federal circuits, but it 
also provides the first fifty-state survey on this “jurisprudentially 
significant issue.”280 As many of the federal and state cases cited in 
this Note demonstrate, courts often become easily confused over the 
relevant due process analysis. Also, unlike in 1977, enough cases 
have now been decided by lower courts to allow the Supreme Court to 
comfortably review the issue in greater depth. As a result, the Court 
should now have what it needs to further, and more concretely, ex-
pand on its analysis from Lovasco.281
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